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In the 90’s, the Mercosur countries experienced a strong growth of trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). To examine the relationship between FDI, trade and regional integration in 
the Mercosur, we tested different disaggregated gravity equations on trade and FDI flows 
between two Mercosur members – Argentina and Brazil – and their partners during the 90’s. 
Our results attest a strong relationship between FDI and imports, but a weak and negative 
linkage between FDI and exports. This reinforces the perception that the investment flows into 
the Mercosur countries has generated strong flows of imports without generating exports. 
Another important result is the relevance of Mercosur in multinational firms strategies that 
seems to be different depending on the country where the firm is located. Firms installed in 
Brazil give an importance to the regional market while the firms installed in Argentina, assume 
that  regional market is not a relevant issue.  
 
Codes JEL : F1, F2. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Latin American countries experienced a strong growth of trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) during the 1990’s. The major factors that let this happen are certainly the 
recovery of economic growth in the region (which is mainly due to macroeconomic stabilisation) 
and the multilateral and regional trade liberalisation process. 
Among the different initiatives of economic integration in Latin America, the Mercosur is the 
most dynamic. Its major economic result is the intensification of regional trade, which was 
multiplied by five during the 90’s. In addition to that, the trade flows with the other countries 
have also substantially risen. The main external partners of Mercosur are EU, US and other 
Latin-American countries. The expansion of trade came together with a strong growth of FDI 
inflows to the region. The annual inflows average rose from $ 2 billions in 1990 to $ 54 billions 
in 1999. The main investors are the EU countries, notably Spain, and the US. 
One can ask if there is a link between the increase of trade and the growth of FDI, in a context of 
trade liberalisation and regionalization occurred during the past decade. In fact, it would be 
interesting to know, firstly, if the Multinational enterprises (MNF) strategies in the region were 
modified by the Mercosur’s creation and, secondly, if FDI has a positive impact on imports and 
exports. These issues are important not only from a micro point of view but also from a 
macroeconomic one.  
The growth of FDI inflows was essential for in financing the current balance in Mercosur in the 
90’s. However, several issues concerning its long term contribution to current and trade balance  
raised as we noticed that their propensity to import was stronger than their propensity to export. 
For instance, MNFs kept buying from their international network of suppliers, and so their 
installation came with a raise in imports. On the other hand, the FDI, strongly focused on service 
sectors, didn’t generate a lot of exports. From a regional point of view, if the MNFs strategies 
were to explore the regional market and not to integrate the Mercosur subsidiary on the 
international production division, their implementation is not going to have a positive direct 
impact on trade balance. 
However, the story is much longer than that because of indirect effects like efficiency 
improvement, transfers of technology and also the long term impacts of FDI in the financial 
balance (transfers between subsidiaries, profits repatriation, etc.). We are not going to discuss all 
these effects in this paper but rather concentrate on three issues: what are the links between FDI 
and imports, between FDI and exports, and finally, what is the influence of Mercosur in FDI 
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flows. We don’t intend to exhaust these subjects, as we’re obliged to make some simplified 
assumptions. By the way, our results seems to be compatible with other studies done in the same 
field.  
No consensus on the link between trade and FDI arose neither in the theoretical nor empirical 
literature. From a theoretical point of view, both flows were traditionally considered as 
substitutes: the FDIs are an alternative to exports in order to penetrate markets protected by 
strong trade barriers. Nevertheless, if most of the theoretical approaches indicate substitution 
links between these two flows, empirical results often show the existence of complementarity.  
In an earlier work, we have estimated the links between FDI, trade and regional integration 
(Castilho and Zignago, 2000). Our results did not show any evidence of statistically significant 
link between the regional integration process and the FDI inflows, even though it attested the 
complementarity between FDI and imports. These results were surprising. The origin of 
Mercosur itself is in sectoral trade agreements and, as in the automobile industry, it is clear that 
the establishment of a common market influenced the strategies of MNFs in Brazil and 
Argentina (Porta and Kosakoff, 1997). We attempted to find significant results in, at least, some 
sectors. We have then turned to national disaggregated data and, in the present empirical work, 
we use them to analyse the linkage of bilateral trade and FDI inflows to Mercosur in the 90’s2. 
The present paper begins with an overview of Mercosur, its trade and FDI flows. The second 
section outlines the major empirical evidences for the linkages between trade, investment and 
regionalism.  
 
TRADE AND FDI TRENDS IN THE MERCOSUR 
The Southern Common Market (Mercosur) - the custom union between Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay - was created in 1991. Even if the free trade area and the custom union are 
far from being perfect, on 1rst January 1995, they concerned around 85 % of the products. The 
intra-regional trade liberalisation was spread over four years - from the end of 1991 to the end of 
1994 - by diminishing the intra-regional tariffs by 25 % per year. A common external tariff 
(CET) fluctuating between 0 and 23 % (with an average of 11.3 %) was adopted in 1995. 
Nevertheless, some sectors (such as equipment goods, computers, telecommunications, sugar, 
                                                 
2  The data used here come from national sources, what has several implications : they don’t use the same 
classifications, they have different time coverage and other minor methodological differences. We dispose of 
Argentinean data for the period 1991-1999 from the CEP (Centro de Estudios para la Producción) and of Brazil data, 
for 1990-1994 and 1996-1999, from the Central Bank of Brazil.  
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wheat and the automobile industry) figured in an exception list and were not concerned by this 
CET3. Some of them are still subjected to special regimes, notably the automotive sector. 
The recent Mercosur evolution – and in particular, the CET – has been troubled by the recent 
macroeconomic difficulties in Argentina and Brazil. In the last six years, the CET was changed 
twice: first, when Brazil raised the TEC by 3 points in response to the 1998 financial crisis 
(followed by the other partners); second, in 2001, when Argentina launched a package of 
measures in order to improve its exports competitiveness – and was again followed by Uruguay 
and Paraguay. This seems to be the worst crisis Mercosur has passed through during its short life. 
Actually, these countries are involved in some regional negotiations, like the FTAA (the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas), the FTA with the European Union and the one with the Andean 
Community (CAN). The effects of these negotiations are opposite: the first one made Mercosur 
countries think about the pertinence of maintaining the imperfect Common Market in a bigger 
regional FTA. At the same time, the other ones reinforce Mercosur because the negotiations are 
between groups of countries – and can not be conduced between the isolated countries. 
We must outline that intra-regional tariff reduction in the first part of the decade coincided with 
multilateral liberalisation programs led separately by each of the member states. Fundamentally, 
the implementation of Mercosur occurred in a context of a large adjustment process and deep 
economic reforms that pointed out an important change in the development strategy of the Latin 
American countries. Those countries also undertook measures of financial liberalisation, such as 
the strong reduction of control on capital flows. Another important feature of this process is the 
deregulation and the privatisation process. The privatisation has affected a lot of sectors and let 
foreign investors participate in the purchase of national enterprises. This process started in 
Argentina and has, until now, gone further there than in Brazil. These changes, together with the 
recovery of economic growth and the implementation of a common market, have contributed to 
the rise of FDI in the region. 
The Mercosur’s trade flows substantially increased during the 1990s, as we can see in Graphic 1. 
This growth was led mainly by imports. Between 1990 and 1999, imports’ growth was 190%, 
while exports growth was 60%. As a consequence, Mercosur’s countries presented, from the 
middle of the 90’s, a growing trade balance deficit. This seems to be a reflex of domestic 
economic expansion, trade opening and exchange rate evolution. 
                                                 
3 Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay were allowed to keep 300 products outside the CET until January 1st 2001 whereas 
Paraguay can maintain 399 products till 2006. The list of exceptions was anyway modified by the measures taken by 
Argentina lastly. 
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Graphic 1: Mercosur's total trade. 1990-1999. 
 
Source: IDB. 
These trends seem to benefit mainly the OECD countries (as shown in table 1, their weight in the 
Mercosur’s imports rose from 40 % in 1985 to 67 % in 1998), even if the intra-trade’s growth 
rate was higher. The role of OECD as the most important supplier was enhanced, but its 
importance as a destination for Mercosur’s exports was weakened (showing the loss of 
dynamism of the Mercosur’s exports).  
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Table 1. Mercosur’s main trade partners 
  Total Flows   Imports   Exports 
  
1986 
(%) 
1990 
(%) 
1995 
(%) 
1999 
(%) 
  
1999 
(%) 
growth rate 
95/99 (%) 
  
1999 
(%) 
growth rate 
95/99 (%) 
European Union 23.1 25.6 27.1 27.4  28.7 8.1  25.9 5.1 
NAFTA 26.1 23.4 20.6 23.0  24.8 8.9  21.1 32.8 
     United States 22.8 20.3 18.0 20.0  21.7 11.0  18.2 27.3 
MERCOSUR 9.9 11 19.5 19.8  19.3 9.4  20.4 5.4 
     Argentina 3.4 3.5 7.6 8.3  8.7 4.2  7.8 32.4 
     Brazil 4 4.6 8.3 8.6  8.5 21.6  8.7 -1.4 
     Paraguay 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.3  0.7 -13.7  1.9 -29.0 
     Uruguay 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.7  1.4 -5.6  2.0 1.4 
Chile 1.6 2.2 3.2 2.8  1.8 -23.5  3.8 3.1 
Andean Community 1.6 2.2 3.5 3.0  2.3 12.8  3.8 -18.3 
Asian NICs 2.3 4.8 6.5 5.0  5.6 -11.5  4.3 -27.7 
Japan 6.3 5.9 5.2 4.3  4.8 -5.6  3.7 -23.3 
China 2.2 1.1 2.0 2.1  2.4 55.6  1.7 -24.5 
Total 100 100 100 100   100 6.0   100 5.6 
Source: BID-INTAL.           
 
As told before, FDI (together with portfolio investment and short term capital) played an 
important role in financing the current balance deficit of Mercosur economies in the 90’s. In fact, 
the 90’s are marked by the return of Latin American countries to financial markets. 
The growth of FDI was very strong during the decade, as shown in table 2. Indeed, it was more 
vigorous than the trade growth. As stressed by Chudnovsky (2001), Mercosur countries were 
responsible for 6% of FDI flows to developing countries between 1997 and 1999. In fact, this is 
explained by a conjunction of factors, like the macroeconomic stabilisation and the economic 
recovery in the region, as well as the change of the regulation environment (led by the 
privatisation process and the trade and financial liberalisation). The formation of Mercosur itself 
had contributed to the growth of FDI, as we will see later. 
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Table 2: FDI inflows to Mercosur 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999p 
Argentina 1 836 2 439 3 218 2 059 2 477 3 818 4 922 5 099 4 504 22 358 
Brazil (1) 324 89 1 924 801 2 035 3 475 9 644 17 879 26 346 31 235 
Paraguay 77 86 118 75 137 155 246 270 423 306 
Uruguay ... ... ... 102 155 157 137 113 155 229 
Mercosur  2 237 2 614 5 260 3 037 4 804 7 605 14 949 23 361 31 428 54 127 
Source: IADB and (1) 1996/2000: BCB 
The main investors are the European countries, as the individual tables for Argentina and Brazil 
show in the next sections. The United States is the second investor. Together, these countries are 
responsible for 99% of total FDI in Mercosur countries in 1999. 
In terms of sectoral distribution, the service sector  became the main receptor in the last years. It 
has replaced the leading position of the industrial sector in Argentina in the beginning of the 
decade and lately, the same has happened in Brazil. This is mainly explained by the privatisation 
process that brought foreign capital to public utility sectors, like telecommunications. The 
geographical and sectoral aspects of FDI will be detailed in the next sections, where FDI in 
Argentina and Brazil is analysed separately. This is not only because of differences in countries’ 
statistics but also to emphasize their differences.  
ARGENTINA 
The Argentinean economy was characterised in the first half of the decade by the 
macroeconomic stabilisation and trade liberalisation process. As a consequence, the recovery of 
the economic growth led to a strong growth of imports (Graphic 2). In 1995, the peso crisis 
impacted strongly on Argentinean economy, reducing its growth rates. This impact was 
minimized by the recovery of the Brazilian economy, the first client for Argentinean exports. But 
this would not last long as the growing instability in international financial markets (Asian crisis 
in 1997 and Russian crisis in 1998) strongly affected these countries. The change in Brazilian 
exchange regime in 1999 and the economic recession reinforced the already existing 
competitiveness and the consequent balance of payment problems in Argentina. 
In contrast, exports volume grew by a much lower rate. This trade imbalance is directly related to 
the appreciation of the Argentinean peso, which rate was fixed to the US dollar in 1991. As a 
consequence, its exports loose competitiveness and the imports were boosted in a period of 
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growing domestic demand. FDI flows4 were multiplied by almost 3 between 1990 and 1997 
(table 2) but there is a boom in 1999 with US$ 22 billions of FDI inflows.  
Graphic 2: Argentina: GDP, FDI and Trade  (base: 1999=100)  
 
Source: ECLAC, IADB. 
As Table 3 illustrates, the FDI flows are concentrated in four sectors that responds for 74% of 
total industrial FDI. The sector which received more investments is oil and gas, a fact that is 
deeply related to the privatisation of the national petroleum firm YPF in the beginning of the 90’s. 
All along the decade, the exploitation of Argentinean oil and gas reservations has also raised 
significantly. The second sector in terms of receiving FDI is electricity and again privatisation is 
in the origin of the FDI growth. Food and beverages have absorbed 12% of total FDI, followed 
by the automotive sector. In contrast with the first two sectors mentioned before, the investment 
in these last two industries was mainly greenfield. 
                                                 
4 The aggregated statistics come from BID/IRELA (1998) and OECD, so the source is the Balance of Payments, 
what explains the differences to the national data. 
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Table 3: Argentina: FDI by activity. 1995-1999. 
 1990/94  1995/99  1990/99  
Sector US$ millions % US$ millions % US$ millions % 
Oil and gas 3 271 30,4 22 457 38,3 25 728 37,1 
Electrical energy 2 452 22,8 8 054 13,7 10 506 15,1 
Food and beverage 1 855 17,2 6 279 10,7 8 134 11,7 
Automotive industry 755 7,0 6 016 10,3 6 771 9,8 
Products of oil and gas 705 6,5 3 245 5,5 3 950 5,7 
Chemistry 643 6,0 2 988 5,1 3 631 5,2 
Mineral extraction 89 0,8 2 664 4,5 2 753 4,0 
Pulp and paper 158 1,5 1 758 3,0 1 916 2,8 
Petrochemistry 0 0,0 1 448 2,5 1 448 2,1 
Other industries 847 7,9 3 737 6,4 4 584 6,6 
TOTAL 10 777 100,0 58 645 100,0 69 421 100,0 
Source: CEP.       
 
The Table 4 details the origin of the foreign investment in Argentina during the decade. US 
appear to be the most important investor, if countries are taken individually. If not, European 
Union is the first foreign investor, responsible for 47% of total FDI. Among European countries, 
Spain is the most important one (25%), followed by France that responds for 8% of total 
investments. Some “historical” investors in Argentina like the UK, Italy and Germany had lost 
their importance. In Mercosur, Brazil is the only investor country, but its participation is very 
weak – 1,7% of total FDI. Chile’s investments in Argentina are much more important, they 
correspond to 6,6% of total investments. 
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Table 4. Argentina: Main Investors Countries. 
US$ millions 
  1990-1999 (cum.) 
 cumulated flows % 
United States 48.731 38.1 
Canada 3.138 2.5 
     European Union 59.472 46.5 
Spain 31.873 24.9 
Netherlands 2.412 1.9 
France 10.293 8.0 
Italy 6.249 4.9 
United Kingdom 5.336 4.2 
Germany 2.565 2.0 
      Mercosur 2.363 1.8 
Brazil 2147 1.7 
Uruguay 216 0.2 
Chile 8.411 6.6 
Mexico 1494 1.2 
Switzerland 1.296 1.0 
Japan 407 0.3 
Others 2.693 1.9 
TOTAL 128.005 100.0 
Source: CEP   
 
BRAZIL 
 
For the Brazilian economy, the 90’s can be divided in two periods. The first half of the decade is 
marked by a slow economic growth, due to the political and economic instability - see Graphic 3. 
In 1994, a new stabilisation program was implemented, inaugurating a period marked by low 
inflation and economic growth. The recovery of the economy is marked by a strong growth of 
imports and very strong inflows of foreign direct investment. The exports, however, presented a 
mediocre performance – 75% increase in 10 years contrasting to 170% growth of imports.  
From 1995 to 2000, the investment inflows were multiplied by 10. This can be partially 
explained by the privatisation process – the Brazilian Central Bank estimated for 1997 that about 
28% of FDI inflows were directed towards privatisation – and by acquisition of Brazilian 
companies.5  
 
                                                 
5 See Bonelli (2001) to a detailed analysis of merges and acquisitions in Mercosur countries.  
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Graphic 3: Brazil: trade, FDI and GDP in the 90's (base: 1990=100) 
 
Source: BCB, IADB. 
 
The FDI data by activity (table 5) shows that there are some important changes in the sectoral 
distribution of inflows in Brazil along the 90’s. First, we notice that the inflows directed to 
services sector have been increasing along the decade. While in 1990 only 24% of total FDI went 
to this sector, in 2000, about 80% of FDI was directed to services. The industrial sector, that used 
to absorb most part of foreign investment, lost its position as the major recipient of FDI, even 
though we notice a new increase in investments into industrial sector in 20006. 
The main service sectors receiving FDI are electricity and gas, telecommunications, financial 
intermediation and services rendered to companies7. The increase of FDI inflows to some sectors 
is related to the advancement of the privatisation process, which led to “an increased inflow of 
foreign direct investments, reaching US $5.2 billion in 1997, contrasting with the US $2.6 
billion in the previous year” (BCB, 1998). 
Among the industrial sectors, five of them concentrate 85% of foreign investment. The 
automotive industry is the major FDI recipient and in the period between 1996 and 2000, it is 
the sector that has maintained the most constant level of foreign resources. The other three 
sectors, which are important recipients, are chemical products, food and beverage, electronic 
and communication material and machine and equipment. 
                                                 
6 We can not neglect the fact that privatisation rhythm in Brazil has slowed in the last two years. 
7 As stressed in the Central Bank FDI report, “it is worth mentioning the sharp increase of participation of ‘services 
rendered to companies’, basically because this group comprises companies whose activity is participation in the 
share capital (holdings) and , as such, distribute the received funds to companies of other sectors.” 
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Table 5. Brazil: FDI by activity (US$ millions). 
 12/1995*  1996-2000 (cum.) 
 Stock % Flows % 
Agriculture and mineral extraction 688,6 1,6 1 781,0 1,7 
Petroleum extraction and related services 72,0 0,2 861,5 0,8 
Extraction of ores 330,3 0,8 597,1 0,6 
Manufactures 23 402,4 55,0 18 454,6 17,8 
Motor vehicles and parts  2 851,3 6,7 4 360,5 4,2 
Chemical products 4 747,7 11,2 3 334,5 3,2 
Food and beverages 2 332,4 5,5 2 856,4 2,8 
Electronic materials and communication apparatus 589,7 1,4 1 686,1 1,6 
Machines and equipment 2 072,3 4,9 1 226,6 1,2 
Non-metallic mineral products 816,0 1,9 843,2 0,8 
Office machines and data processing equipment 441,4 1,0 732,7 0,7 
Electrical machines 1 100,3 2,6 685,2 0,7 
Rubber and plastic articles 1 317,9 3,1 592,0 0,6 
Basic metallurgy 2 566,2 6,0 506,4 0,5 
Services 18 439,0 43,4 83 452,5 80,5 
TOTAL  (US$ millions) 42 530,0 100,0 103 688,0 100,0 
* Data from FDI Census, BCB, 1996. Considered inflows to firms > US$ 10 million/year. Source: BCB. 
 
Considering the investing countries, the EU countries, if taken together, are the major investors 
in Brazil, as it’s been for a long time. However, there are some important changes among these 
countries. Germany, the historical major European investor in Brazil, reduced strongly its 
investments. The participation of the United Kingdom has also been reduced from the beginning 
of the decade. These reductions were more than compensated by the growth of FDI from Spain, 
Portugal, Netherlands and France. In 2000, Spain became the main foreign investor, responding 
for more than 30% of inflows, while Portugal consolidated its second place in the rank of 
investing countries in Brazil. One must notice that these two countries’ investments are directed 
mainly towards services – notably, communication and electricity.  
The US investments fluctuated sensibly during the decade, going from 29% of the FDI stock in 
1990 to 18% in 2000. Japan and other Mercosur countries have deceiving FDI amounts in Brazil. 
On the contrary, the investments from fiscal paradises are quite important – almost 10% of total 
FDI. As this investment comprises investments from other countries and some special forms of 
operations (including illegal money being repatriated), we cannot take it into account in our 
analysis. 
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Table 6: Brazil: Investor Countries 
US$ millions 
  1990 1995 1996-2000 (cum.) 
 Stock % Stock % Flows % 
United States 10.488 28.8 10.852 25.5 24.536 23.7 
Canada 1.979 5.4 1.819 4.3 1.102 1.1 
     European Union 14.715 40.4 14.336 33.7 57.018 55.0 
Spain 122 0.3 251 0.6 21.548 20.8 
Portugal 68 0.2 107 0.3 7.563 7.3 
Netherlands 1.179 3.2 1.535 3.6 9.650 9.3 
France 1.928 5.3 2.032 4.8 7.902 7.6 
Italy 1.303 3.6 1.259 3.0 1.613 1.6 
United Kingdom 2.708 7.4 1.793 4.2 2.064 2.0 
Germany 5.615 15.4 5.828 13.7 1.676 1.6 
      Mercosur 85 0.2 1.268 3.0 989 1.0 
Uruguay 51 0.1 874 2.1 458 0.4 
Argentina 34 0.1 394 0.9 531 0.5 
Switzerland 3.222 8.8 2.815 6.6 1.118 
1.1 
Japan 3.440 9.4 2.659 6.3 1.471 1.4 
Fiscal Paradises 1.478 4.1 4.668 11.0 14.675 14.2 
Others 1.055 2.9 4.114 9.7 2.778 2.7 
TOTAL 36.461 100.0 42.530 100.0 103.688 100.0 
(1) British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Bermudas, Panama et Bahamas Islands. 
Source: BCB. 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In a previous work (Castilho and Zignago, 2000), we have used a gravity approach to test the 
correlation between trade, investment and regionalism in Mercosur for the period of 1985-1997. 
The complementarity between FDI and trade was confirmed: the coefficient of FDI inflows was 
positive and highly significant what indicates a positive linkage between FDI and imports. On 
the other hand, the link between regional integration and FDI was not significant.  
This last result was quite surprising as there is some evidence that recent FDI in Mercosur is 
linked to an export strategy in the region, at least in some sectors. As shown by Porta and 
Kosacoff (1997) and Chudnovsky (2001), some MNF installed in one of the Mercosur countries 
showed interests on exporting. The automotive industry is a good example. The new firms 
installed in Mercosur manifested their intention to explore the regional market and the benefits 
of the Mercosur auto-regime8. Perhaps, this can not be generalized to all sectors and, if we want 
to capture them, we need to make a disaggregated analysis. In fact, as stressed by Fontagné 
                                                 
8 This doesn’t mean that multinational firms plan to export outside Mercosur and then the increase of exports may 
correspond only – or mainly – to extra-Mercosur exports growth.  
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(1995), a better analysis of the correlation between trade and FDI requires a bilateral and sectoral 
approach. However, the lack of disaggregated data concerning FDI flows toward these countries 
often restrains this kind of analysis. 
In this paper, we use a disaggregated gravity approach9 in order to examine the linkages between 
trade and FDI and the influence of regionalism on MNF strategies in the case of Mercosur.  
The equation (1) tests the hypothesis of substitution between FDI and imports. For the gravity 
variables – size and distance – the expected signs are respectively positive and negative. The set 
of sectoral dummies controls for sectoral specificities. Concerning the investment variable, a 
negative coefficient would indicate that an increase of FDI would lead to a reduction of imports 
– confirming the substitution hypothesis – while a positive coefficient would indicate a 
complementarity relation between investment and imports. This can occur when the subsidiary is 
an assembling unit (or responsible for just one part of the production process) or when firms keep 
buying their components from their original suppliers. 
 
ijkt
k
kkijktijjtitijkt uDFDIdistYYM   )1ln(lnlnlnln 4321  (1) 
where: 
i: FDI’s host country (Brazil or Argentina) 
j: trade partners  
k:  sectors  
Dk: sector dummies 
t: year for the period 1990-1999 
M: bilateral import flows 
Y: the current dollar GDP 
dist: distance in kilometres 
 
The equation (2) tests the linkage between exports and FDI. A positive coefficient for FDI 
suggests that foreign investments generate exports. One could argue if it would be necessary to 
consider a temporal lag between investment and exports in order to take into account the 
maturation time of the first. But, as stressed before, a great part of foreign investments in 
Mercosur countries in the 90’s were acquisitions of public (privatisation) or private firms and, in 
this case, there’s no reason to consider the temporal lag. Anyway, we would consider this result 
with caution.  
 
ijkt
k
kkijktijjtitijkt uDFDIdistYYX   )1ln(lnlnlnln 4321  (2) 
                                                 
9 See Fontagné and Pajot (1998) and Chédor and Mucchielli (1998) for other uses of gravity equations to analyse 
FDI and trade relationship. 
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Lastly, the equation (3) examines the influence of Mercosur formation on foreign investment 
strategies. A positive coefficient for the integration variable suggests that the Mercosur 
integration was an additional factor of attraction for FDI in the 90’s. Concerning the gravity 
variables, the size, from the host country’s point of view, might constitute an important factor of 
attraction and, from the investing country’s point of view, it might be an indicator of investment 
capacity. The geographical distance might have a negative linkage with investment. In fact, more 
distant are two countries, greater are the transport costs. Also, more incentives have to be 
produced locally by the firms.  
We use two variables to represent the Mercosur integration. The first one is a dummy that equals 
one after 1995, when the common market was launched.  This measure neglects, however, the 
advances in integration made before 1995 (due to the 1988 sectoral agreements and the 
liberalisation schedule launched in 1991). We decided then to represent integration by a kind of 
“revealed trade integration” indicator, that is an ex-post variable corresponding to the part of 
Mercosur intra-regional trade in its total trade. 
The protection indicators (tariffs, for example) are inadequate because, beyond the problem of 
the choice of the indicator (weighed or not, which weight, tariffs or no tariff barriers, etc.)10, it 
would probably not separate the multilateral liberalisation effects from the regional liberalisation 
effects.  
 
ijkt
k
kkijjtitijkt uDregdistYYFDI   4321 lnlnln1ln   (3) 
where reg is: 
- dms = dummy Mercosur: 0 before 1995, 1 after, or 
- lmskt = ln (intra-Mercosur trade / total trade, by sector and by year)  
The three equations are estimated separately for Argentina and Brazil, pooling all sectors and 
years. We use OLS with sectoral dummies. Argentina data comes from the CEP (Centro de 
Estudios para la Producción) and covers 29 countries, 24 sectors – primary and secondary 
sectors – and the period between 1990 to 1999. For Brazil, the data from Central Bank covers the 
same period, 13 primary and secondary sectors and 49 countries. The differences between 
Argentinean and Brazilian sectoral classifications are of no importance for the results as we 
analyse them separately.  
The Table 7 shows the results concerning Argentina and Brazil. The gravity variables show the 
expected signs in almost all estimations. Distance coefficients are notably negative and 
                                                 
10 For a discussion about measures of protection, see Bouët (2000). 
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significant for all estimates. GDP from the investor country presents positive and significant 
estimated coefficients in all equations. GDP from the host countries shows negative coefficients 
in two cases: for Brazil in FDI equation and for Argentina in exports equation. The first result 
must be analyzed together with the coefficient of the integration variable, as we will see later. 
The second one suggest that exports performance in Argentina isn’t linked to GDP evolution, 
what simply means that exports are not residual to domestic demand.  
The main results of our analysis indicate: i) the existence of a positive and significant relation 
between FDI and imports in both countries; ii) the existence of a negative but weak relation 
between FDI and exports in both countries; and iii) an ambiguous effect of integration on 
investment flows: a positive and strong relation in the case of Brazil and a weaker or inexistent 
relation in the Argentinean case.  
The first result confirms our precedent findings and is not very surprising. The FDI in the 90’s in 
Mercosur lead to a strong increase of imports, as the foreign firms kept buying from their 
original suppliers. In this sense, the case of the automotive sector is again very illustrative. A 
detailed analysis of the trade balance shows that the imports of components had grown sensibly 
during the decade, simultaneously to the installation of new foreign firms. 
Concerning the second point, Chudnovsky (2001) shows that foreign firms intend to explore 
regional markets and that exports are not the main objective of these firms. Even if we think that 
these results must be examined with caution (because of the neglecting of the temporal lag), they 
can be explained by several factors: i) firstly, a significant part of investment flows was directed 
towards the services sector, which are typically non-tradable activities; ii) secondly, part of the 
FDI was used in privatizations (and in this case, mainly in the services sector) or in acquisitions 
of national firms, without producing significant changes in the existing production capacities; iii) 
finally, for a great part of foreign firms, their strategy in investing on Mercosur countries intend 
to explore regional market and not to create an export platform like in East-Asia  or in Mexico, 
without generating extra-zone exports.  
The influence of the Mercosur creation on FDI flows is confirmed by our estimations, wherever 
integration is represented by a dummy or by the part of intra-regional trade in total trade. The 
results of both estimations are very close in terms of sign and value of the estimated coefficients. 
Moreover, gravity variables present the expected sign, except GDP of Brazil whose coefficient is 
negative. The only significant difference between the two equations is the coefficient of the 
Mercosur integration that is not significant for Argentina when represented by the part of 
intra-regional trade in total trade. In other terms, Mercosur seems to be more important to Brazil 
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than to Argentina .  
This raise an important issue about the location of MNF inside Mercosur. One could attempt that 
the firms established in Argentina would consider the integrated market important as they are a 
small economy and the participation in Mercosur would make them take benefit from the scale 
of the big market. For those going to Brazil, the domestic market is already big, exports to other 
Mercosur countries would be residuals. But our results suggest the contrary and Mercosur seems 
to favour the location of foreign firms in Brazil. The scale factor, the differences in terms of 
productivity and even the effects of the different exchange regimes on competitiveness can 
explain this preference for the big country. 
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Table 7. Econometric Results 
Estimations Results for Brazil 
Dependent Variable: Imports (1) Exports (1) IDE (1)  IDE (2)  
Explanatory Variables: OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  
R2 0.58  0.66  0.53  0.52  
Number of observations. 1981  2098  2214  2214  
Intercept -15.89 *** -2.83  6.85  3.95  
 -4.24  -1.04  0.61  0.34  
Distance -1.37 *** -1.46 *** -2.12 *** -2.52 *** 
 -15.23  -23.04  -8.28  -9.63  
PIB investor country 1.07 *** 0.88 *** 3.41 *** 3.75 *** 
 26.30  30.31  36.75  38.51  
PIB Brazil 1.16 *** 0.36 ** -2.21 *** -2.04 ** 
 4.09  1.72  -2.62  -2.30  
FDI 0.05 *** -0.01 *     
 6.88  -1.74      
Mercosur integration 0.46 ** 0.02  4.85 *** 12.23 *** 
 2.28  0.15  7.92  3.93  
Estimations Results for Argentina 
R2 0.59  0.64  0.20  0.20  
Number of observations. 5869  5497  6960  6960  
Intercept -27.68 *** 14.25 *** -15.59 *** -19.43 *** 
 -17.39  7.27  -6.02  -8.92  
Distance -1.65 *** -2.32 *** -0.96 *** -0.96 *** 
 -42.66  -58.18  -17.51  -17.22  
PIB investor country 1.18 *** 0.98 *** 0.72 *** 0.73 *** 
 60.97  48.70  28.13  27.89  
PIB Argentina 2.05 *** -0.84 *** 1.40 *** 1.75 *** 
 13.52  -5.24  6.77  10.35  
FDI 0.05 *** -0.02 *     
 6.52  -1.92      
Mercosur integration -0.75  0.40 *** 0.24 *** -0.04  
   -1.16    5.92   2.62   -0.69   
Notes: *** signif. at 1% level, ** at 5% and *at 10%, the t-statistics figure below the coefficient 
values. Coefficients of sector dummies are not presented. IDE (1): integration represented by 
Mercosur dummy (equals 1 for t>1994); IDE (2): integration represented by the part of intra-zone 
trade in total trade. 
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